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INTRODUCTORY GENERAL COMMENTS 
For clarity, respondents-cross appellants Green, Shook, and Castle will in this brief again 
often be referred to collectively as "Green" and appellants will again often be referred to 
collectiveiy as "Weitz". 
In Idaho, for someone to acquire an ownership interest in land without paying for it 
andor obtaining a written instrument conveying ownership, one of a very few legal theories 
must be complied with and the required elements proven by clear and convincing evidence in a 
quiet title action. 
It is true that the trial court found, referring to the year 1975, that 
"Prior to that time the Schoepflins treated the disputed property as 
their own." (Amended Memorandum Decision R Vol. VIII, p. 
1639) 
However the trial court correctly applied the law and recognized that treating property as 
your own will not suffice to transfer ownership of property. 
Mistakenly believing that you own something can cause you to develop an emotional 
attachment to it, but it will not by itself transfer ownership. 
In the case at bar Weitz revealed their beliefs and their emotional attachment, but did not 
produce the evidence necessary to meet the high burden of proof that was needed. In fact, as 
Green's first brief demonstrated, with regard to some required elements the evidence 
demonstrated the opposite of what Weitz needed to prove. 
A recently retired judge once made a very insightfnl observation which this writer would 
like to relate. Magistrate Judge Hamlett noted, in deciding a matter, that one side had produced 
emotion and the other had produced law and supporting facts. Judge Hamlett then noted that in 
the court system facts and law prevail. 
As is usual in any trial, evidence offered in our case sometimes conflicts. The trial judge 
resolved these conflicts properly applying the correct burden of proof. 
Appellants' Reply Brief often selectively excerpts from the record and transcript without 
providing the conflicting evidence which well supports the trial judge's findings. In doing this 
Weitz is trying to get the appellate court to second guess the trial court without considering the 
full record. Some of these occasions have already been addressed in Green's first brief and 
others will be addressed in this brief. 
This brief will primarily address Green's counterclaims. However, because Greens, 
Shooks, and Castles cannot prevail upon their counterclaims for trespass and slander of title 
without the trial judge being affirmed in his finding that Weitz does not own the land in question, 
this brief will also address ownership. 
I. BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT 
The trial court correctly observed that Weitz must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was an express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Judge Stegner 
then found that "as to the express or implied agreement, the Weitz family has failed to make its 
case by clear and convincing evidence." (R Vol. VIII, p. 1640.) 
The correctness of this finding is fully supported by Green's first brief at page 12 and that 
recitation will not be repeated here. 
However, the Weitz Reply Brief questions Judge Stegner's finding that Thomas Rogers' 
testimony undermined the testimony of 69 year old Homer Ferguson about a conversation that 
took place 30 years earlier. In questioning the Judge's finding, Weitz Reply Brief incorrectly 
asserts at page 3 that Thomas Rogers "did not become involved with the property until 2001 
when he managed the Family Trust following his mother's death." 
The uncontroverted evidence on this point is found in Thomas Rogers' testimony quoted 
below. 
Q. When did you get out of the Navy and return to this area? 
A. I returned in May of 1971. I started school at the University of 
Idaho shortly thereafter. 
Q. When you returned to this area, what role, if any, did you fill 
with regard to this quarter section that you sold to Mr. Green? 
A. I basically oversaw the management of it. My mom didn't have 
a lot to do with it or didn't want a lot to do with it. She didn't know 
a lot about it. She signed all the contracts, set up for logging and 
grazing purposes, but other than that I pretty much oversaw what 
was going on up there. I tried to make trips up there as frequent as 
I could. Tr p. 1753, L. 14 to p. 1754 L. 2. 
Further Mr. Ferguson testified that he had contact with Tom Rogers in this same time 
frame. ( Tr p. 894, L. 19-21 .) 
Judge Stegner noted that Thomas Rogers testified that he doubted his mother had ever 
seen the fence in question. Thomas Rogers' testimony in this regard was even supported by 
Homer Ferguson when he testified as follows. 
Q. Did you ever deal with Mrs. Rogers as -- go upon the property 
with Mrs. Rogers herself! 
A. No, I don't think Mrs. Rogers was strong enough to go up on the 
property. Tr p. 894, L. 15 - 18. 
Judge Stegner had the opportunity to observe Homer Ferguson, who testified he was 69 
years old (Tr p. 892, L. 16). Mr. Ferguson was relating events and a conversation that took place 
over 30 years earlier. The trial judge decides what weight, if any, to assign to Mr. Ferguson's 
testimony and Judge Stegner concluded that it was "undermined." R Vol. VIII, p. 1639. 
The need to show a mutual agreement is made much harder in this case because one is 
confronted with the question of why would anyone agree to give away 8 L/z acres of land for free. 
This question is never addressed or answered by the evidence in this case. 
At page 5 of the Weitz Reply Brief there is a sentence which reads, "All these good 
people lived with the fence line being the property line for years until Mr. Green arrived and put 
his blinders on and went about his business." The evidence contradicts this statement and 
supports Judge Stegner's finding that Weitz failed to prove an express or implied agreement. 
The aerial photographs produced by both sides show that this "fence" roughly followed 
the northern edge of pasture land on the property Rogers sold to Green. Tom Rogers testified to 
the use of the fence to control cattle. Tr p. 1763, L. 8-11. Thomas Richards, an aerial 
photograph expert, testified that the aerial photos admitted in evidence from 1987 showed that 
trees were cut in the disputed area and skidded down to the landing on Rogers' property. Tr p. 
1790, L. 2 to p. 1791, L. 18. This confirmed Mr. Rogers' testimony regarding logging in the 
area by the Rogers in the same time frame. This shows that the Rogers used the land north of the 
zigzag cattle fence as their own land, did not view the fence as an ownership boundary, and 
clearly had not agreed to or acquiesced in the "fence" as a boundary. 
11. BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE 
While attempting to attack the trial court's finding that the Greens were bona fide 
purchasers for value, Weitz's Reply Brief makes factual errors. 
In the first line on page 14, Weitz's Reply Brief asserts that "The disputed property was 
last used as a dairy farm up until 1994". On page 2 of the same brief it is asserted that "up until 
1975 the disputed property was a dairy f m . .  .". 
Mrs. Weitz herself testified as follows: 
Well, my grandfather's last cattle left the place - I think the last 
one died or was sold in 1972. And to my knowledge the fence 
wasn't maintained after that time and it just gradually became 
dilapidated and it fell into the ground. Tr p. 255, L. 7-1 1. 
Also on page 14, a few lines below the middle, appears a claim that the "large blue steel 
gate" was on the disputed property, but all the evidence from both sides places the gate on 
property which is included in Weitz's deed and not on the disputed property. See Exhibits 3 and 
4 in evidence. 
At page 18 of Weitz's Reply Brief extensive excerpts from the deposition of Josh Ritter 
are presented. This deposition was properly considered by the trial court. At the bottom of page 
18 an answer given by Mr. Ritter is quoted with a portion emphasized. Other parts of Josh 
Ritter's deposition are quoted in Weitz's Reply Brief by giving first the question and then the 
answer. Here, however, the question posed is omitted, creating the false impression that Mr. 
Ritter is referring to activity on the disputed property. If the question and answer had been 
given, the following would have appeared in Weitz's Reply Brief. 
Q. At times did you - at times did you observe during any 
motorcycling activities that maintenance had been done on the 
network of roads on the Weitzes' property, just in general? 
A. Well, yeah, like driving around, I mean, all the time, you know, 
there was always one part of the road that was getting kind of, I 
guess, replowed by Jerry in particular like along with the 
Caterpillar, you know, and, you know, I can remember him doing 
that all the time, up through there, taking the Caterpillar and just 
kind of working on a road here and there and just kind of redoing 
it, just kind of running the Cat over the road. So, there's that. I can 
also, we --you know, I went up with the Weitzes four or five times 
at least helping them get wood for the winter in different, in 
different places. See p. 18, L. 6 - 22 of the Deposition of Joshua 
Ritter. 
Mr. Ritter's answer, when viewed in light of the actual question, provides no precise 
information as to where any activity occurred. The evidence is uncontroverted that on Weitz's 
deeded property there are many roads and many places to get wood for winter. Once the 
question is known, Mr. Ritter's answer does not reveal whether the activities he described took 
place on the disputed property or Weitz's deeded property. 
The foregoing shows that in the Bona Fide Purchaser for Value section of Weitz's Reply 
Brief only selective and sometime erroneous and misleading recitations from the trial are 
presented. The huge amount of different and conflicting testimony and evidence presented at 
trial are omitted in an attempt to get this Court to second guess the trial judge's findings of fact 
without considering the full record. 
Finally, with regard to the BFP issue, Judge Stegner found that the dilapidated shack 
pictured in Exhibit NN would not alter Greens' BFP status. The fact that the related lease and 
associated agreement, Exhibits 23 and 24, referenced only land situated in the !4 section 
described in the Schoepflin (Weitz's predecessor in interest) deed is important. It means that 
anyone reviewing the public records would not receive any indication that Schoepflins claimed 
any ownership interest in Rogers' land. 
Arguing the impact of Exhibits 23 and 24, Weitz's Reply Brief at page 4 in the first full 
paragraph asserts that governmental entities and their employees thought Schoepflins owned the 
disputed property. These two exhibits were introduced during the testimony of Rockford Weitz 
who was not even born when they were created. No testimony or evidence was introduced about 
what any governmental entity or its employees thought or did. In fact no evidence was 
introduced to show that any governmental entity or its employees ever saw this tiny structure or 
knew its exact location. It may be that Menill Hart ran this repeater station himself. We do not 
even know how long it operated. 
What we do know is that by the time Mr. Green viewed the property, nothing was left of 
this "radio station" but a tiny collapsing shack which was not connected to anything. If there 
was a power line at some time, it had been completely removed. 
Judge Stegner's finding that Greens were bona fide purchasers is fully supported by the 
record. 
111. SLANDER OF TITLE 
Weitz's Reply Brief says that it cannot understand Judge Stegner's finding that Weitz 
committed slander of title. Then the brief at page 28 makes the unjust accusation that Judge 
Stegner "seems to pounce upon a singular sentence contained in the complaint". 
Judge Stegner's thorough discussion of slander of title begins with the last paragraph on 
page 11 (R Vol. VIII, p. 1646) of his final decision. The judge states clearly that his decision is 
not based on a singular sentence when he says: 
It appears that the Weitz family slandered the Greens' title by 
making the assertions they did in their complaint. The real 
questions presented are whether the actions of the Weitz family were 
malicious and whether the Greens can show special damages. 
"Malice has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless 
disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement." Weaver v. 
Staford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234 1244 (2000). As to this 
component, it appears that the Weitz family was reckless in its 
challenge to the Greens' title. As an example, the complaint 
alleges that the hogwire fence on the eastern portion of the 
disputed property "extended southerly along the eastern boundary 
of the Disputed Property to its intersection with the fence and 
fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE '/4 of said 
Section 8 and the Disputed Property." Complaint at fi 21. This 
statement is false. Further, it was reckless of the Weitz family to 
make this assertion. Consequently, malice has been established. 
The final remaining question is whether the Greens can establish 
special damages. If they can, then all of the elements of a slander 
of title claim will have been proven. A review of the case law 
indicates that attorney's fees constitute "special damages" for 
purposes of creating aprimafacie case of slander of title. See Ray1 
v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573 
(1984). Consequently, the Castles, Greens and Shooks have 
proven the Weitz family slandered their title. R Vol. VIII, p. 1646- 
1647. (emphasis added) 
Judge Stegner made clear that Weitz made multiple recklessly false statements when he 
used the words "assertions" and "As an example". 
There were other examples the judge could have chosen. A couple are given below, but 
first it is important to note that on April 12, 2005, Mrs. Weitz filed an affidavit with the court 
swearing that the statements in the complaint were true. R Vol. I, p. 170, paragraph 3. 
Road 
The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 14 and 15 reads as follows. 
14. By 1967, a road had been constructed by Schoepflins within 
the Disputed Property and north of the fence and fenceline running 
easterly and westerly for the entire length of the Disputed Property 
(the "road"). 
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the 
Plaintiffs and Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, 
motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular access to areas 
within Plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property. R Vol. I, p. 
20-21. 
Weitz knew that the road had not been continuously used and maintained. Weitz had to 
know that these two paragraphs gave a false picture and that this mattered to the case. Gerald 
Weitz admitted that there had been no work on the road after 1994 until October, 2002. Tr p. 
288, L. 23 to p. 289, L. 1. Thus Greens purchase in July 2002 was before the October 2002 work. 
The court made findings regarding this alleged "continuously used and maintained" road 
in two places in its decision. These findings read as follows: 
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron 
Monson, a land surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson 
began his work in August 2002. In the process of surveying, he hung 
surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating that he was in the 
process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the 
surveyor's actions, the Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a 
nephew of Gerald Weitz, went up and cut out the log that had fallen 
across the trail, thereby enabling motorized travel the length of the 
trail without detour. Gerald Weitz, the Weitz family patriarch, took 
his Caterpillar tractor to the property and on at least two different 
instances bladed the trail in such a way as to convert it from an 
overgrown trail to one which would allow a four-wheel-drive pickup 
truck to travel from one end to the other. R Vol. VIII, p. 1638. 
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz 
family's exhibits to be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the 
Weitz family's property, it did not appear to be so at the time the 
Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when the Greens 
purchased the property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a 
motorcycle or a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle (except where the log 
had fallen across the pathway and necessitated passage by some 
other means). Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had been most 
recently bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father around 1994. For the eight 
years prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had fallen into disuse. It 
did not appear, on the ground, to be part of a seamless web of 
roadways extending onto the Weitz family's property. R Vol. VIII, 
p. 1641. 
Thus the court found that after altering the facts on the ground, Weitz made a false statement 
designed to strengthen its claim and overcome Green's true status as a BFP without notice, 
Alleged fence 
The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 10 and 23 reads as follows 
10. A fence and fenceline were constructed no later than 1929 and 
have existed in the same place since that time in the vicinity and 
running easterly and westerly over the entire length of the quarter- 
section line between the NE % and SE % of said Section 8 (the 
"fence and fenceline"). R Vol. I, p. 19. 
23. On information and belief, some Defendants or their agents, at 
some time during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant 
portion of the fence and fenceline by cutting the fence wire 
approximately every twenty feet of its length, by destroying some 
fence posts, and by destroying rock piles that helped stabilize some 
of the fence posts. R Vol. I, p. 22-23. 
Taken together, these paragraphs assert that a fence really existed until defendants tore it 
down. Of course at trial the court learned that this was false and that Weitz knew it all along. 
Mrs. Weitz admitted that the original fence was not maintained after 1972 and had just fallen 
into the ground from lack of maintenance. Tr p. 255, L. 7-1 1. 
After Green bought the property, Mrs. Weitz hired Dana Townsend to build another 
fence where the old one used to he. Tr p. 801, L. 23 - p. 802, L. 6. Mrs. Weitz knew that it was 
this new fence that had been removed because she knew the original fence had already fallen into 
the ground. Further, Mr. Townsend testified that it was he who created the rock gabions (piles). 
Tr p. 822, L. 9 - p. 823, L. 17. The complaint falsely states that the original fence had rock piles 
(gabions) and that these were destroyed by defendants or their agents. 
After extensive parrying, Mrs. Weitz finally admitted that she was aware that the 
condition of the "fence" mattered to her case. Tr p. 1345, L. 10 to p. 1347, L. 25. Knowing that 
the "fence" was down and knowing that its condition mattered to her case, Consuelo Weitz hired 
Dana Townsend to build a new one. Then Weitz filed a complaint, later verified by an affidavit, 
that stated essentially that the original fence existed until July 2003 when defendants or their 
agents tore it down. These were recklessly false statements designed to strengthen Weitz's 
claim. 
Adverse Possession 
One might ask why in finding slander of title Judge Stegner chose the example of the 
never completed eastern fence. One possibility is that the Judge had on his mind the fact that 
shortly before trial he had denied Weitz's attempt to add a claim for adverse possession. He may 
have chosen to make the finding that there had never been a complete enclosure because this 
example also showed that Weitz's adverse possession claim could not have succeeded. 
This thought might also explain why the trial judge gave two reasons for the failure of 
Weitz's prescriptive easement claim. At page 6 (R Vol. VIII, p. 1641) of his final decision Judge 
Stegner wrote: 
An additional impediment to the Weitz family establishing a 
prescriptive easement to the road is that they cannot establish 
exclusive use of that road. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 1 18 
P.2d 740 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court held: "[a]n individual 
using land as a road in common with the public cannot acquire a 
prescriptive right of way against the owner." Id. at 144, 118 P.2d at 
744. Numerous individuals, unconnected with the Weitz family, 
used the trail during the time in question. Because it is necessary to 
establish exclusive use in order to prove a prescriptive easement, this 
is yet another reason why the Weitz family's claim of a prescriptive 
easement must fail. R Vol. VIII, p. 1641-1642. 
A showing of exclusive use is also required to prevail on an adverse possession claim. See Rice 
v. Hill City Stock Yards, Co., 121 Idaho 576,826 P.2d 1288 (1992). 
So the foregoing finding by Judge Stegner provides an additional reason why Weitz's 
adverse possession claim could not succeed. 
IV. APPLICABILITY OF I.C. 8 6-202. ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS 
The section in Weitz's Reply Brief, at page 29, on this subject incorrectly claims that the 
decision by Mr. and Mrs. Gerald Weitz to go upon the disputed property and completely change 
the central piece of evidence in this dispute was made after the Rogers Trust and Green had 
reached a settlement. 
First the record shows conclusively that the settlement was reached weeks after the 
decision to build a new fence was made. See Exhibit 10 - SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 
RELEASE OF CLAIMS dated August 1, 2003. See also the testimony of Dana Townsend 
saying he was instructed to build the fence no later than July 16,2003. Tr p. 803, L. 7-9. 
Second and more importantly, the record shows that it was during the preliminary 
injunction hearing on April 15, 2005, about 20 months after the trespass by Weitz, that Weitz 
and their attorney learned for the first time that a settlement between Green and Rogers Trust had 
occurred. See the affidavit of attorney Landeck at paragraph 6. R Vol. 11, p. 299. 
Why does Weitz try to create the false impression that they trespassed because Rogers 
Trust and Green reached a settlement, when it is so easily refuted by the facts in the record? 
The following facts surrounding the trespass are important. They reveal Mrs. Weitz's 
true state of mind and the willful nature of her behavior. 
The testimony of Mr. Townsend, who built the new fence, follows. 
Q. [By Mr. Brown] What was that? 
A. It was that Mr. Landeck had -- I guess there was probably some 
discussion prior to that within that week that said we'd like you to 
rebuild the fence up there and I need to check with my attorney on 
that. And she contacted him and then later on, I don't know if it 
was -- could have been that day or the following day she said well 
I managed to get a hold of him and his word is go ahead, go up 
there and rebuild the fence. 
Q. Okay. Just to the best of your own ability could you just relate 
to the Court the nature of the conversation that you had with Consi 
Weitz concerning the type of direction she gave you in regards to 
the fence building, just try to remember her words. 
A. I think she just basically stated we would like you to rebuild 
the fence and there was simply no -- there was no other discussion 
is the best of memory serves me.. . Tr. P. 801 L. 14 to p. 802 L.6 
Q. And then it's my understanding that the actual work that you did 
on the property in regards to the fence was that -- well, you tell me 
the dates, the July dates that you would have been there? 
A. July 21st to the 25th probably. And what I stated before in the 
deposition is that on the hours that are shown on the 17th of 
Thursday was the -- probably very short order before that was 
when I was instructed to build the fence. So I can even actually 
further limit that down 14th, 15th or  16th was when I was 
instructed to build the fence, the 17th is when I began cutting the 
cedar fence posts for that actual project. And then on the 21st 
through the 25th I started construction, reconstruction of the 
fence up there on the ridge. (emphasis added) Tr p. 802, L. 24 to 
p. 803, L. 13 
At the end of his first answer set out above, Mr. Townsend testified that Mrs. Weitz said 
"well I managed to get a hold of him and his word is go ahead, go up there and rebuild the 
fence." (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Landeck did not give the go ahead to rebuild the fence. Mrs. Weitz was instructing 
Mr. Townsend to build a whole new fence. What Mr. Landeck actually said is found in his 
deposition placed in evidence at the trial. 
Mr. Landeck's testimony on this point follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Schwam] Okay. Did there come a time when you were 
asked specifically about doing something to or with regard to the 
disputed fence, and I mean by the Weitzes? 
A. I believe the first specific discussion about anyone doing 
anything to the fence occurred on July 16 of 2003. 
Q. And would you tell me what transpired, who was present and 
what were the discussions? 
A. I'm refreshing my memory with reference to a billing statement. 
I have no notes of this conversation, and I don't have a vivid 
recollection of this conversation. So, I'm really relying on my - 
the notes that I made for purposes - for billing purposes, which 
indicate that I had an office conference with Consuelo which lasted 
not more than fifteen minutes, in which we talked about the Green 
dispute. We talked about fence repair, and we talked about the 
logging plan. As to the fence repair, I recall being told that they 
wanted to retain someone, hire someone to repair the fence. And, 
my recollection is that I did not have any problem with them 
repairing the fence and that I told her that. And, as to the logging 
plan, she indicated that they had a desire to log in the area, and I 
believe that I advised her to -that they ought not to log within the 
disputed area, that that should be off limits for, while this - as this 
- until this matter was resolved. (emphasis added) See deposition 
of Ronald Landeck, considered by the court as testimony and 
included in the record as an Exhibit, p. 27, L. 21 to p. 28, L. 24. 
Q. Now, on the 16'~, did she ever tell you that they wanted to 
employ a person to build a new fence? 
A. No. See deposition of Ronald Landeck, p. 30, L. 2-5. 
Mr. Landeck's July 24, 2003 billing is in evidence as Exhibit B to the Order Settling 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on Appeal: R Addendum Volume. 
It reads in pertinent part (with emphasis added). 
07/16/03 
RJL Office conference with Consuelo Weitz 
regarding Green dispute, fence repair and 
logging plan. 0.25 45.00 
Exhibit EE contains the photographs taken by Mr. Green after Mrs. Weitz told him that 
she claimed there was a fence. Mr. Green testified that he photographed any and all signs of a 
fence that he could find. EE shows that in late 2002 the fence was beyond repair and another 
would have to be built before you could honestly describe what was there as a "fence". 
As was just noted in the previous section of this brief, paragraphs 10 and 23 of the Weitz 
Complaint, filed on February 4, 2004, falsely asserted that continuously up to February 2004 a 
fence really existed. I am sure that in July 2003 Mr. Landeck actually believed that there was a 
real fence upon which routine maintenance repairs could be done in order to preserve it in a 
steady state condition. He must have still believed this in February, 2004 when he signed the 
Complaint. 
Thus, from Mr. Landeck's false perspective, which resulted from being lied to by his 
client, it appeared that he was authorizing the maintenance of evidence in its current condition. 
He could not have understood that his client was going to do something which would create new 
and different evidence. 
Weitz lied to their attorney regarding the condition of the "fence" until the preliminary 
injunction hearing when Mrs. Weitz admitted that the fence had fallen into the ground. Given 
that the half mile long fence had fallen into the ground and was only the "remains of a fence" 
(See Judge Stegner's Decision, R Vol. VIII, p. 1640), it is natural that in instructing Mr. 
Townsend. Mrs. Weitz used words like "rebuild" and "build". But Mrs. Weitz had to know that 
no attorney would authorize the creation of new evidence; so with Mr. Landeck she used the 
word "repair". 
This sequence of events reveals why the court found that: 
The facts establish that Mr. and Mrs. Weitz in pressing ahead were 
unreasonable. (See Judge Stegner's Decision, R Vol. VIII, p. 
1646). 
These facts also reveal Judge Stegner's mistake in finding that being "unreasonable" constitutes 
a defense to a finding of willfulness. (For a full discussion see Respondents' Brief pages 35 - 
39.) What could be more "willful" than lying to your attorney and then further misleading your 
attorney to get cover for evidence destruction or creation. The 240 trees were cut down as a 
result of intentional and willful behavior by Weitz. 
V. DAMAGES 
On page 12 of Weitz's Reply Brief two separate arguments are made. One is made in the 
second to last paragraph and one is made in the last paragraph. 
Because the response to the argument in the last paragraph is shorter, it will be dealt with 
first. Weitz wants to know why, if Green felt that 240 trees were lost, did Green not claim their 
value from Rogers. At the time the trees were cut, land had already been sold to the Castles and 
the Shooks, so it is assumed that "Green" is used collectively by Weitz. If any of the three 
couples, including Todd and Tonia Green, had made claim for the lost trees against the Rogers 
Trust, such a claim would have been frivolous. 
The warranty deed (Exhibit D) given by the Trust to Todd and Tonia Green carries a 
promise to defend title. It does not insure against a neighbor coming on the property and cutting 
down trees. 
It is doubtful that the Castles or Shooks have any rights against the Rogers Trust, but they 
certainly have no rights beyond those of Greens. 
The argument made in the second to last paragraph is that "there were not 240 trees cut". 
Weitz's Reply Brief uses the word "shrubbery" to describe what was cut. But the 
testimony of "the arborist who cut the shrubbery" (this quote is taken from page 12 of Weitz's 
Reply Brief), Mr. Townsend, is set out below. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you removed and why? 
A. I removed small trees with the exception of one larger tree. The 
small trees were removed because they were an obstruction to free 
working in the vicinity. And some of the trees I simply thinned 
them so that there would be a healthy mound of trees left. There 
was even -- even too many in my opinion still left, but that wasn't 
my orders to clear the land, my orders were to clear the fence. I 
just simply did what was necessary to construct the fence. One 
large tree that was, what I viewed a hazard to work under, a 
widow maker, was located on the eastern partial there and that was 
sawn down and cut and just distributed to the side. Tr p. 807, L. 17 
to p. 808, L. 6. 
Q. The Grand Fir -- were the majority of the trees or the saplings 
that you removed, were they Fir? 
A. I do believe so. I looked at the report, the Northwest 
Management report and they had taken the tally on them and it 
seemed like actually the species composition was pretty well 
mixed between Grand Fir, Doug Fir and Ponderosa Pine. All 
quite small and most of them under -- I mean, a couple with three 
inch caliper size tree. (emphasis added) Tr p. 808, L. 18 to p. 809, 
L. 1. 
Portions of the Report from Northwest Management (Exhibit TT) appear below, and 
provide the number and size of the trees removed from the Greens', Shooks', and Castles' 
property by Weitz. 
- ...................................... .. - ................................................................. 
Summary of Trees Severed on Castle Property 
Landowner Species Stump Estimated Estimated Number 
Diameter DBH Height o f T r ~  . 
--- . -- ---......... -- . - - -...-....-... 
Summary of Trees Severed on-Green Property ... - --. 
Landowner Soecies Stumo Estimaled Estimated Number 
~ iame ie r  DBH Height o f ~ r e e s  
......... ..... 
....... ........ .. .  
Summary@ Tre~Sev?lodoo~?hoeI?_E~~erC~. .... .......... 
Landowner Species Stump Estimated Estimated Number 
~ iamoier  DBH Height o f  Trees 
. . .....-.. 
Shoak PP 3 2.2 10 . ...... ................ 5 
Totat 40 . 
During the trial, not a single witness disagreed with the foregoing tree count. Thus the 
experts for Green and Weitz seem to agree that 240 trees were cut. 
During the trial, Weitz's attorney used the word "saplings" and now uses the word 
"shrubbery". It does not matter what word is used because the facts remain the same and the law 
to be applied remains the same. 
I.C. § 6-202 uses the phrase "any wood or underwood, tree or timber". The definition of 
"underwood in the Wehster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary (1996 Edition) is "woody 
shrubs or small trees growing among taller trees". 
In our case trees were cut, but even if shrubs were cut I.C. 5 6-202 would still apply, and 
the measure of damages for a temporary trespass would still be the cost of restoring the property 
to its condition before the trespass. 
VI. MARKET VALUE 
At page 29 pf the Weitz's Reply Brief the testimony of Mr. Vahlkamp is mentioned. Mr. 
Vahlkamp was a witness for Weitz who offered the opinion that cutting the trees did not impact 
the market value of the property. Mr. Vahlkamp admitted that he came to this opinion without 
the use of any comparahles. 
The trial judge correctly determined that the effect, if any, on marketability was not the 
measure of damages. 
VII. MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The use of a hypothetical will clarify the measure of damages which should be applied to 
our case. 
Assume that a homeowner has a fruit tree in his backyard. The homeowner can not use 
all of the fruit from the tree so he is not interested in maximizing output. The owner is interested 
in having the small amount of h i t  he uses be natural and chemical free. As a consequence much 
h i t ,  some wormy, falls to the ground and lays there for awhile each season. Some of the fruit 
falls into the homeowner's swimming pool along with leaves from the tree. The homeowner does 
not mind this because he is retired and has time to clean out the pool each time he uses it. 
An adjoining neighbor, however, has a second story sun deck upon which he sits. This 
neighbor has come to hate the sight of spoiling fruit on the ground and in the pool. One day the 
neighbor cuts down the tree. 
The evidence at trial shows that the value of the tree for lumber was nothing and that the 
market value of the property has either stayed the same or gone up because the market prefers 
not to have to clean fruit and leaves from a swimming pool. 
Does this mean that the homeowner has no redress and must pay out of his own pocket to 
replace the fruit tree? 
The measure of damages has to be the cost of restoring the property to the condition 
before the trespass. If not, the trespasser's values, likes, and dislikes are imposed upon the 
victim. 
Returning to our case we find the victims of Weitz's trespass have a public record filed, 
Exhibit DD in evidence, a Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. 
The last sentence in Section V of this document tells everyone that: 
"Retention of the existing forest is of vital importance to maintain 
the natural environment of the area and is viewed as a primary 
objective of these Restrictive Covenants." 
Section V also says that: 
The harvesting of any timber solely for commercial gain is 
prohibited. 
Danial and Catherine Castle, Steven and Mary Shook, and Todd and Tonia Green, the 
victims in our case, are entitled to have their trees replaced. 
Harold Osbome, a witness for Weitz, testified as follows: 
Q. [BY MR. BROWN] Okay. And then when were you contacted 
in regards to helping the Weitzes in regards to their timber 
management? 
A. They formally contacted me in the spring of 2003. 
Q. Do you know what month? 
A. My notes, records indicate we sat down at the table in April, 
specifically April 26 when we were talking in somewhat detail 
about what I might provide for them as a forestry service. 
Q. And then was it after -- at that time did that initiate your 
involvement in helping them do some, I'll say, logging up on their 
property? 
A. Yes. Tr p. 1367, L. 17 top. 1368, L. 4 
At almost exactly the time of the trespass, Weitz, with the help of Mr. Osbome, was 
engaged in the commercial logging of the Weitz property. 
If the damages are not based on the cost of replacing the trees, but instead upon some 
wood value method, then the victims, Greens, Shooks, and Castles will have the values of Weitz, 
the trespasser, imposed upon them. 
Aside from the obvious unfairness of this result, it would be contrary to the law, as was 
fully discussed in Respondents' first brief at pages 39-44. 
VIII. AD HOMZNEM ATTACKS 
In the trial and the briefing, Weitz through their attorney have made repeated ad hominem 
attacks upon Todd Green. He has been accused of being greedy, of wearing blinders, and of 
having an agenda, presumably sinister. 
Todd Green, in purchasing this property upon which he built his family home, expected it 
to bring some joy into his family's lives, but instead his new neighbor slandered his title and 
trespassed upon his property. Todd went to his seller who had by warranty deed promised to 
defend Green's title. As it happens, the seller preferred to make a one time payment and be 
released from all liability and the duty to defend the title. An agreement to do this was made and 
the Greens have fulfilled their duty, and their promises to Shooks and Castles, by successfully 
defending everyone's title. 
The post trial filings regarding attorney fees and costs show that Todd and Tonia Green 
have had to spend in excess of $160,000.00. 
The judgment against Weitz reveals that Todd and Tonia Green have been awarded 
$52,738.12 in attorney fees, damages and costs. 
The trial record reflects that the Greens received $46,247.16 to release the Rogers Trust 
and to take on its duty to defend. 
As things stand now, without adding in the attorney fees relating to the appeal, the 
Greens have lost in excess of $60,000.00. 
Thus, if the appeal does not change anything, Todd and Tonia Green, who did nothing 
but be the victims of slander of title and trespass, will suffer a loss of more than $60,000.00 plus 
their substantial attorney fees on appeal. 
There is nothing in this case that justifies the ad hominem attacks on Todd Green, but 
there is a great deal about this case that cries out for a decision that would fully compensate the 
Greens. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be affirmed with regard to all of Weitz's claims and the Green, 
Shook, and Castle slander of title claim. The trial court's finding of trespass by Weitz should be 
amplified to include a violation of I.C. § 6-202 and remanded to the trial court to make an award 
of attorney fees under I.C. § 6-202. There should also be a remand to assess damages based on 
the cost of replacing the trees. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Greens on appeal. 
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